The justices will decide whether a president can shut off asylum applications at the southern border by proclamation. The appeals court opinion they will review is narrower, and in places more favorable to the administration, than most coverage suggests.
The Supreme Court on Friday, November 13, 2026, agreed to hear Mullin v. Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services (No. 26-239), the government’s appeal of an April ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that President Trump’s Inauguration Day border proclamation is unlawful to the extent it blocks migrants already inside the United States from applying for asylum and sends them home through removal procedures Congress never wrote. The Supreme Court docket records a one-line order: “Petition GRANTED limited to Questions 1 and 2 presented by the petition.”
That limitation matters. The Court will decide whether Proclamation 10888 and its implementing guidance are lawful, and whether a federal statute, 8 U.S.C. 1252(f)(1), barred the district court from issuing a classwide injunction. It declined to take up the government’s third question, which challenged how the plaintiff class was defined. Argument is expected in spring 2027, according to the American Civil Liberties Union, which represents the plaintiffs.
In the meantime, the policy stays in force. The Justice Department’s petition told the justices that “because the court of appeals has withheld issuance of its mandate, the proclamation’s entry suspension and asylum restrictions have remained in place.”
What most coverage misses
Headlines have framed the case as a fight over an “asylum ban.” The record shows a dispute that is both narrower and more technical, and three points tend to drop out of the summaries.
First, the president’s power to suspend entry at the border is not on trial. The D.C. Circuit majority said so plainly: “The Proclamation’s authority to suspend entry is not challenged here.” The case is about what happens to people who cross anyway and are caught inside the country.
Second, a significant part of the lower-court result drew no dissent. All three appeals judges, including Trump appointee Justin Walker, agreed that the proclamation and guidance could not cancel withholding of removal, the statutory bar on deporting someone to a country where he faces persecution, or the mandatory protections under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Judge Walker wrote that “today this court unanimously holds that those claims must remain open.” The government’s first question asks broadly whether the proclamation and guidance are lawful, so how hard it will contest that point before the justices is not yet clear.
Third, the question the Supreme Court refused to hear is the one Judge Walker pressed hardest. His separate opinion argued that the district court “wrongly issued relief to potentially millions of plaintiffs without standing.” The justices left that class-definition question out of their grant. In RSN’s reading, the class issue may still surface through the 1252(f)(1) question, but the Court has signaled where it wants the argument to focus.
Background: from Inauguration Day to the Supreme Court
On January 20, 2025, President Trump signed Proclamation 10888, “Guaranteeing the States Protection Against Invasion,” published at 90 Federal Register 8333. As the D.C. Circuit summarized it, the proclamation declares that “the current situation at the southern border qualifies as an invasion” because “[t]he sheer number” of foreign nationals “entering the United States has overwhelmed the system.” It suspended the entry of anyone crossing between ports of entry, and of anyone arriving at a port without sufficient documentation, and directed agencies to remove those who crossed anyway.
Department of Homeland Security guidance put that into practice through two channels the appeals court described as “Direct Repatriation” and an accelerated form of expedited removal. People processed this way could not file asylum applications, and claims of torture risk were handled in a single interview rather than the two-stage process set by regulation.
The ACLU, the National Immigrant Justice Center, the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies and allied groups sued on February 3, 2025, on behalf of individual migrants and organizations including RAICES, Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center and the Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project, according to the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies. On July 2, 2025, U.S. District Judge Randolph Moss vacated the proclamation as unlawful, certified a class of everyone subject to the policy, and enjoined enforcement against them, as reported by CBS News and CGRS.
On August 1, 2025, a D.C. Circuit motions panel of Judges Millett, Pillard and Katsas partly stayed that order. According to the later merits opinion, the stay panel narrowed the class to people present in the United States, held that the government was unlikely to win on withholding of removal, and, “acknowledging it was ‘a close call,’” thought the government was likely to succeed in defending the categorical suspension of the right to apply for asylum. Judge Pillard dissented on that point. That preliminary view helps explain why the asylum question remains the most contested part of the case.
A merits panel of Judges Cornelia Pillard, Justin Walker and J. Michelle Childs heard argument on November 3, 2025, and ruled on April 24, 2026. The full court denied rehearing on July 23, 2026, and Solicitor General D. John Sauer filed the petition on August 24. Iowa and other states, America First Legal Foundation, America’s Future and the Federation for American Immigration Reform filed friend-of-the-court briefs at the petition stage, according to the docket. The petition was distributed for the Court’s November 6 and November 13 conferences before it was granted.
Inside the D.C. Circuit opinion
Judge Childs wrote for the majority in the 120-page opinion. Its core holding is statutory. Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.C. 1182(f), lets the president “suspend the entry” of classes of foreign nationals. The majority read that power as limited to entry, not removal: “The word ‘removal’ is noticeably absent from Section 1182(f).”
From there the court concluded that “[t]he power by proclamation to temporarily suspend the entry of specified foreign individuals into the United States does not contain implicit authority to override the INA’s mandatory process to summarily remove foreign individuals.” It rejected the companion argument under 8 U.S.C. 1185(a), the travel-control statute, writing that both provisions “afford the President discretionary powers over who may cross our borders and enter the United States. But those provisions do not confer presidential discretion over removal procedures.”
On asylum, the majority accepted that the ultimate grant is discretionary. “We do not question that asylum decisions are ultimately discretionary,” it wrote. “But the INA does not support categorical, ex ante denial of asylum with no consideration of what the would-be applicant may face if removed.” The asylum statute, 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(1), says any noncitizen “physically present in the United States” may apply. The majority read that as a right to file that a proclamation cannot cancel.
The majority also leaned on process. The asylum statute requires certain conditions on asylum applications to be set “by regulation,” and it was undisputed that the guidance never went through notice-and-comment rulemaking. “We cannot license the Executive to do by Proclamation and informal guidance what Congress has determined must be done, if it can be done at all, by rule,” Judge Childs wrote. On torture claims, the court found that the guidance “casts aside the congressionally required rule and collapses the process it mandates into a single interview,” and was therefore “arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law.”
The court distinguished its own 2022 decision in Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas, which concerned expulsions under the Title 42 public health authority, as resting on a public health provision that “has a substantially different aim.” It also said it did not read Trump v. Hawaii, the 2018 travel-ban decision, to hold “anything to the contrary.” On the remedy, it held that 1252(f)(1) did not bar the district court’s injunction as crafted, and that the provision does not reach vacatur under the Administrative Procedure Act at all.
Judge Walker’s dissent: the futility argument
Judge Walker’s opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, may serve, in RSN’s assessment, as a template for the government’s merits brief. He opened by agreeing “with much of the majority’s thoughtful opinion,” including that “[t]he Executive cannot remove aliens to countries where they will be persecuted.” He then set out three disagreements: the class included people without standing; “[t]he Executive has already exercised his lawful discretion to deny all asylum applications. So he may foreclose the application process as futile”; and the injunction was barred by 1252(f)(1).
The asylum argument rests on the statute’s text. Since the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, the law has said the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General “may grant” asylum. If the executive may deny every application, Walker reasoned, the right to file does not include a right to file a futile one. He pointed out that the D.C. Circuit itself had said as much in Huisha-Huisha, and that the stay panel in this very case had found the futility logic likely to prevail.
He also argued that the majority’s reading of the expedited-removal statute creates its own anomaly: “The majority does not contest that the President may deny all asylum applications. If a President decides to do that, all § 1225(b) does is confer upon individuals the special privilege of being forced to languish in a detention facility while their individual asylum applications get inevitably denied. That is pretty odd.”
A large part of his opinion argues that the president holds an inherent constitutional power to expel foreign nationals, drawing on nineteenth-century cases such as Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893). On that view, the policy was unlawful only because it conflicted with the procedures in 8 U.S.C. 1225(b) and 1229a, and 1252(f)(1) forbids lower courts from issuing injunctions that order officials to follow those very sections. He joined the majority’s holding that 1252(f)(1) does not bar vacatur.
The government’s case to the justices
The Solicitor General’s petition adopts the futility theory directly. “Granting asylum is solely a matter of discretion,” it argues, and “the INA makes clear that asylum is a purely discretionary benefit.” The president, it says, “acted well within his authority in preemptively indicating that asylum applications filed by aliens who violate the proclamation’s entry suspension would be denied.”
The petition also makes a policy case. Citing a declaration in the appeals record, it states: “Since the proclamation took effect, border encounters have fallen by 93 percent, dropping to the lowest levels since the 1960s.” It quotes Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin describing the policy as an “indispensable” tool and warns that the ruling threatens “the Administration’s single most effective policy in resolving a border crisis.” RSN has not independently verified the 93 percent figure, which the petition attributes to the government’s own filing and which does not state a comparison period. CBS News separately reported that unlawful crossings “have reached historic lows.”
Counter-arguments
The plaintiffs’ position is that the statute settles the matter. “The president does not have the right to unilaterally override the protections Congress has afforded those fleeing danger,” Lee Gelernt, the ACLU’s lead counsel, said after the grant. The majority added a practical warning: accepting the government’s reading “would treat Congress as having empowered the Executive Branch to cut off asylum wholesale for any reason without any assessment of the nature of the risks the affected individuals would face if sent back.”
Some of the sharpest support for the majority’s reasoning comes from restrictionist analysts. George Fishman of the Center for Immigration Studies, which favors lower immigration, argued in a June 2026 report, “On Asylum, the Legislature Needs to Legislate,” that the D.C. Circuit read the statute correctly. “If its decision leads to a renewed border debacle, the fault lies with Congress, not with the court,” he wrote, noting that “Congress has given aliens the right to apply for asylum even when they are ineligible to receive it.”
Others on the right see the ruling as predictable rather than correct. Andrew Arthur, also of the Center for Immigration Studies, called the outcome “likely inevitable given the claims at issue and the partisan makeup of the circuit court” and argued that sections 212(f) and 215(a) give the president broad power. Two of the three merits judges were appointed by Democratic presidents; Judge Walker was appointed by President Trump. Readers should weigh that observation against the fact that Judge Walker agreed with the majority on withholding and torture protections.
There is also a constitutional wrinkle. The proclamation’s invasion language invokes the Constitution’s guarantee that the United States will protect each state “against Invasion.” The D.C. Circuit majority did not rest its holding on that clause, and the questions the Supreme Court accepted are framed around the statute and the remedy, not the invasion finding itself.
What is established, disputed and not established
Established:
- The Supreme Court granted review on November 13, 2026, limited to the legality of Proclamation 10888 and its guidance, and to whether 8 U.S.C. 1252(f)(1) bars the classwide relief (docket No. 26-239).
- The D.C. Circuit held on April 24, 2026, over a partial dissent, that the policy is unlawful insofar as it circumvents the INA’s removal procedures and blocks asylum applications by people present in the United States.
- All three appeals judges agreed the policy cannot strip withholding of removal and CAT protections.
- The entry suspension and asylum restrictions remain in effect because the appeals court has withheld its mandate.
Disputed:
- Whether the discretionary nature of asylum lets the executive refuse applications in advance as futile.
- Whether 1252(f)(1) barred the district court’s classwide injunction.
- Whether the president holds an inherent expulsion power independent of the INA’s procedures.
Not established:
- How much of the drop in border encounters is attributable to the asylum restrictions specifically, as opposed to the entry suspension or other enforcement measures. The government’s 93 percent figure comes from its own declaration.
- How many people have been removed under the challenged procedures since January 2025. RSN found no figure for that in the documents reviewed.
- The argument date and timing of a decision. The ACLU expects argument in spring 2027.
Analysis: why the case may turn on Congress
In RSN’s analysis, the case is less a contest over presidential power than over which branch must act when the asylum system is overwhelmed. Both opinions accept that asylum is ultimately discretionary. They disagree over whether the INA requires a migrant to be heard before that denial. If the justices side with the majority, the administration would keep its entry ban and could try to pursue a similar goal through notice-and-comment rulemaking, although the majority added the qualifier “if it can be done at all.” If they side with Judge Walker, the decision would confirm a broad executive tool that a future administration could also use, or abandon, without Congress.
RSN has covered this tension for years, from the 2016 argument that a new president could turn attention to border security to a DHS report questioning apprehension rates at the border. More recently, the Supreme Court’s handling of mandatory immigration detention showed the same pattern of courts parsing statutory text that Congress has left unchanged for decades, and the President’s own recent remarks on deportation policy suggest the politics remain unsettled.
What accountability would look like
- DHS should publish how many people have been processed through Direct Repatriation and the proclamation’s expedited removal track since January 20, 2025, and how many raised fear claims.
- The government should release the underlying data for the 93 percent encounter figure, including the baseline period, so it can be tested in public rather than only in a court declaration.
- If the administration believes futile asylum applications should be barred, it can test that limit through notice-and-comment rulemaking while the case is pending.
- Congress should decide whether the right to apply for asylum should apply to people who cross between ports of entry during a declared emergency, rather than leaving the answer to litigation.
Sources: Supreme Court docket No. 26-239; Petition for a writ of certiorari (Aug. 24, 2026); D.C. Circuit opinion, No. 25-5243 (Apr. 24, 2026); Proclamation 10888, Federal Register; CBS News; ACLU press release (Nov. 13, 2026); Center for Gender and Refugee Studies case page; Andrew Arthur, Center for Immigration Studies (Apr. 29, 2026); George Fishman, Center for Immigration Studies (June 16, 2026).
Image: Exterior of the U.S. Supreme Court Building, Washington, D.C. Photo by the U.S. Geological Survey Office of Communications, public domain, via USGS.
How this article was made: Right Side News researched and drafted this article with the help of AI tools. Sources are linked so readers can check them. Spot an error? Tell us in the comments and we will correct it.
