A Trump-appointed federal judge has extended his order blocking the White House from barring CNN, MS NOW and Politico reporters. The government says a national security rationale justified the ban. The judge found almost nothing in the record to support it. The more lasting question is what the White House is asking the courts to give up, and who would inherit that power next.
On October 13, U.S. District Judge Timothy J. Kelly of the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction in Cable News Network, Inc. v. Trump, No. 26-3287 (TJK), holding that the three news organizations and three of their reporters are likely to succeed on all three of their claims: that revoking their White House “hard passes” denied them due process under the Fifth Amendment, and that it amounted to both retaliation and viewpoint discrimination under the First. The next day, according to TheWrap, Justice Department lawyers filed a notice of appeal to the D.C. Circuit, and the White House called the decision “misguided.”
Most coverage has framed the ruling as a contest between the President and outlets he dislikes. That framing misses what the 26-page opinion actually documents. By the court’s assessment, the government’s national security rationale arrived after the ban, rested on a declaration from an official who does not work at the White House, and was not supported by any identification of what was supposedly classified, under seal or otherwise. And in defending the ban, the Justice Department told the court, by the judge’s count no fewer than five times, that the D.C. Circuit precedents protecting reporters’ credentials were wrongly decided. Conservatives should think carefully about what it would mean to win that argument.
What Happened, According to the Record
The sequence below is taken from the opinion’s background section (pp. 2–7). On the afternoon of September 18, 2026, President Trump posted on Truth Social that he was “proud to announce that, effective immediately,” he was “banning” CNN, MS NOW and Politico “from the White House.” Asked about an hour later whether there was a “particular reason,” he answered: “No . . . it’s really just cumulative stories over the last two years. . . . [T]hey purposely write negative news. And they do that because they want to try and diminish the Republicans and a Republican administration.” He added that he would “love it” if the outlets “could straighten themselves out.”
According to the complaint, as recounted in the opinion, reporters from the three organizations arrived at the White House complex the next morning and were turned away by the Secret Service; their passes had been deactivated. The outlets sued on September 21. On September 22, the “White House Press Office” sent each organization a letter, which the court describes as “unsigned and not on official letterhead,” stating that the President had decided to revoke their hard passes for violating “the standards of professionalism and decorum expected of those given access to the White House Complex,” including “trafficking in verifiable falsehoods about national security and other issues” and “publishing sensitive or classified information.” The letters gave the outlets until 5:00 p.m. on September 25 to contest the decision.
Judge Kelly granted a temporary restraining order on September 24, resting on the due process claim, and ordered the passes restored. After an October 8 hearing, he issued the preliminary injunction now on appeal, this time reaching the First Amendment claims as well. He also rejected what the opinion calls the government’s “perfunctory, two-sentence request” to stay the injunction pending appeal (p. 26 n.10). The plaintiffs’ reply brief, cited by the court, put the number of affected reporters at 78 (p. 14).
The judge is not an obvious adversary of this administration. President Trump nominated him in 2017, and the Senate confirmed him 94–2, according to his public biography. He also presided over the 2018 dispute over CNN correspondent Jim Acosta’s pass, and his new opinion quotes his own words from that case: “Sherrill explicitly recognizes the President’s right to engage with whomever he pleases. Certainly, he need not ever call on Mr. Acosta again” (p. 15).
The National Security Rationale the Record Does Not Contain
The government’s central defense was that the President would have revoked the passes anyway, because the outlets had published classified or sensitive national security information. Under the Supreme Court’s Mt. Healthy framework, that defense can defeat a retaliation claim if the record supports it. The court found that it does not, for reasons that are worth stating precisely, because they are findings about the government’s evidence rather than about the outlets’ journalism.
First, the President did not mention national security when he announced the ban or when asked for the reason that day. When the phrase appeared in later posts, the court concluded it “appears to have been simply another way for him to describe Plaintiffs’ alleged inaccuracies and unfairness,” suggesting that national security “was merely a post-hoc justification for the decision” (p. 17).
Second, the September 22 letters, the court found, do not actually say the President decided on national security grounds, contrary to the government’s brief (pp. 17–18). They also “conflate concerns about otherwise protected speech” with security concerns.
Third, the government’s only sworn support came from Kingsley Wilson, press secretary for the Department of Defense, which the opinion notes is “now also known as the Department of War.” Her declaration described the Pentagon’s own press-access changes and asserted that a similar White House policy would be reasonable. The court observed that she “does not purport to know much about the White House or the President’s decision here” (p. 19) and that her claims about the three outlets were “conclusory” (p. 19).
Fourth, and most striking, one of the cited stories was a January 2026 CNN article about plans to rebuild the bunker beneath the White House East Wing. The reporter’s hard pass was renewed in June 2026, six months after it ran. An MS NOW reporter whose June 2026 story was also cited in the letters likewise had a pass renewed afterward (p. 11 n.5). “Amazingly,” the judge wrote, “Defendants appear to have been unperturbed by that same story when they renewed that reporter’s hard pass back in June” (p. 24). The court also noted that many of the reporters who wrote the cited stories did not hold hard passes at all (p. 24 n.9).
Finally, the government chose not to put anything else before the court. In the opinion’s words: “Defendants—for whatever reason—chose not to submit any other material, classified or unclassified, under seal or ex parte, in support of their asserted national security interest.” The court said it does not question the deference courts give to national security judgments in many contexts, but concluded that “there is practically nothing national security-related in the record connected to the President’s decision” to which it could defer (p. 24). The government, it added, did not “even bother to identify what specific information in any of these ‘reporting incidents’ was allegedly classified or sensitive.”
That is the institutional failure in this case, and it belongs to the Justice Department. If the administration possesses evidence that these outlets endangered national security, the courts provide procedures for presenting it, including in camera and ex parte review. It declined to use them. A national security claim that the government will not support even under seal is not one a court can credit, and it is not one the public should credit either.
The Precedent the Government Wants Overturned
The due process holding rests on two D.C. Circuit decisions. In Sherrill v. Knight (1977), the court held that a bona fide Washington correspondent’s interest in a White House press pass is a liberty interest that “may not be denied without due process of law.” In Karem v. Trump (2020), a case from the first Trump administration, the circuit reaffirmed that “a duly issued hard pass may not be suspended without due process,” and required fair notice, in advance, of both the prohibited conduct and the possible sanction, measured by a particularly “stringent” vagueness and fair-notice test because First Amendment interests are involved (pp. 9–10, quoting both cases).
Judge Kelly found that nothing published before the September 18 post came close to that standard. The government pointed to a January 2026 White House Press Office post about leaks and to the federal statute criminalizing disclosure of certain classified information, 18 U.S.C. § 798. The court answered that the post announced no standard and no sanction, that the government had not claimed the outlets published any of the four categories of information the statute covers, and that the court was “unaware of any occasion” on which the government has applied that statute, “on the books for over half a century,” to reporters in the plaintiffs’ position (pp. 11–12).
The government’s deeper argument was that Sherrill and Karem should not exist. The opinion records that the Justice Department made the point “no less than five times” in its brief, and responds: “Fair enough. But as they know, that is a matter above this Court’s pay grade” (p. 9). The appeal gives the administration a route to press that argument before the D.C. Circuit, and potentially the Supreme Court.
Here the conservative interest deserves plain statement. If Sherrill and Karem fall, a President may revoke a reporter’s White House credential by social media post, without published standards or prior notice. That power would not expire in January 2029. It would pass to every successor. The outlets most exposed to a future administration hostile to their coverage would not be CNN or Politico. Law professor Jonathan Turley made the point in a September 20 column, calling the ban an “ill-considered, damaging move” and warning that the claimed authority would be “a dangerous and unfettered power” available to future presidents against conservative outlets. He also noted that the Biden White House repeatedly attacked Fox News and its reporters, but did not ban them over their coverage.
RSN has made the same argument about consistency in other settings, including student political speech and the limits of federal power, and about an executive branch that tries to control both sides of a lawsuit. A rule is only a principle if it binds the people who hold power as well as the people who want it.
What a President May Lawfully Do
None of this means the White House is powerless over press access, and the opinion is careful to say so. It states that “no one should interpret the Court’s decision to suggest that President Trump’s concerns about accuracy and fairness in the media’s reporting are unfounded, or that the government is powerless when its true aim is to protect national security when classified information is unlawfully disclosed” (pp. 1–2). It repeats that “no one should read this decision as suggesting that President Trump’s complaints are meritless” (p. 16).
The law leaves a President substantial room. He may decline to call on reporters, grant interviews selectively and favor some outlets with access to officials; the opinion expressly distinguishes those “commonplace” choices, which no court has held unconstitutional (p. 15). In the Associated Press’s separate suit over press-pool access, a divided D.C. Circuit motions panel in June 2025 stayed most of a lower-court injunction as to restricted spaces such as the Oval Office and Air Force One, and the full court declined to rehear that order, according to the case summary. And the White House may set neutral rules for who receives a hard pass at all.
That last point is illustrated by a case from the previous administration. In May 2023, the Biden White House announced that existing hard passes would expire and that reporters would have to requalify, generally through accreditation by a congressional or Supreme Court press gallery. About 500 journalists lost their passes, among them Simon Ateba of Today News Africa. He sued and lost. In Ateba v. Leavitt (D.C. Cir. Apr. 8, 2025), the court held that the White House Press Area is a nonpublic forum and that the policy was lawful because it was “both reasonable and viewpoint neutral.” Judge Kelly relied on that same forum holding (pp. 20–21). The difference between Ateba and this case is the difference the First Amendment cares about: a general rule applied to everyone, versus a ban aimed at three named outlets because of what they wrote. “Simply put,” the court concluded, “that is unlawful viewpoint discrimination” (p. 21).
The Government’s Case, Fairly Stated
The administration’s position is not frivolous, and readers should weigh it. At the hearing, according to ABC News, Justice Department lawyer Michael Velchik argued that the President has broad authority to remove outlets based on national security determinations, that the letters provided sufficient process, and that “[a]ccess to the White House is a privilege, not a right.” The government also relied on Baltimore Sun Co. v. Ehrlich (4th Cir. 2006), which rejected a retaliation claim against a governor who directed his executive branch not to speak with two journalists, reasoning that selective access is “a pervasive feature of journalism.”
There is also a structural argument that Sherrill itself is mistaken: that a credential granting physical access to the President’s workplace is a courtesy, not a liberty interest, and that courts should not superintend who enters the West Wing. That argument may yet persuade a higher court. But it is an argument for a different rule, and the D.C. Circuit has twice rejected it, most recently in a case brought against this same President. Until that court or the Supreme Court says otherwise, the rule binds. On Ehrlich, the district court’s answer was that a ban affecting 78 reporters and excluding them from a space open to their competitors “cuts far deeper” than an official’s refusal to take a reporter’s calls (pp. 14–15).
What Is Established, and What Is Not
Established by the record: the dates and text of the President’s announcement and his stated reasons; that the September 22 letters were unsigned and came after the ban; that the government submitted no evidence beyond the letters and the Wilson declaration; and that at least two cited stories preceded the renewal of the authors’ passes. The appeal is reported but RSN has not reviewed the filing.
Not established: the final outcome. A preliminary injunction is a finding that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed, not a judgment on the merits. The court did not find that any of the outlets’ reporting was accurate, nor that none of it disclosed sensitive information; it found that the government had not supported its national security claims with evidence. Whether the D.C. Circuit will stay the injunction, or revisit Sherrill and Karem, is unknown. The injunction also does not cover press-pool assignments or travel aboard Air Force One, which TheWrap reports remain restricted for some of these outlets.
Sourcing note: the account of the ruling above is drawn from the full text of the court’s memorandum opinion, with page citations to that document. The appeal filing and the White House’s “misguided” statement are as reported by TheWrap; RSN has not reviewed the notice of appeal itself. The hearing arguments are as reported by ABC News.
The Question That Outlasts This Administration
Conservatives have legitimate grievances about the conduct of the national press, and the opinion itself declines to dismiss them. But the remedy for biased coverage has never been for the government to decide who may report from the briefing room. The remedy is competition, criticism and, where the law is broken, prosecution supported by evidence.
The administration has asked the courts for something larger: the authority to remove reporters by announcement, and the abandonment of the precedent that forbids it. If it wins, the next President who regards a conservative outlet as a purveyor of falsehoods will have the same authority, and the same justification. The accountability question for this White House is narrow and answerable. If it has evidence that these outlets harmed national security, it should put that evidence before a court. If it does not, it should stop claiming it does.
Featured image: the empty podium in the James S. Brady Press Briefing Room. Photo by JoshBerglund19, via Wikimedia Commons, licensed CC BY 2.0.
