Four Iran-linked vessels, three of them tankers under United States sanctions, slowed, looped, anchored or switched off their location transponders directly over undersea internet cable routes in the Gulf of Oman in October. This happened in the same weeks that senior Iranian officials publicly threatened those cables. That is the finding of Windward, an Israeli maritime analytics company, which published its tracking analysis on October 29. The Financial Times reported the findings on November 6.
No cable has been cut, and no outage has been reported. What the data shows is where the ships went and when they went dark. What they were doing there is not established.
What the tracking data shows
Windward’s analyst Gilad Karo traced the four vessels through the Batinah corridor off northern Oman, where seven cable systems run close together: 2Africa, Bay of Bengal Gateway, AAE-1, the Oman Australia Cable, Europe India Gateway, Transworld and SeaMeWe-4.
- Celestial Sea (International Maritime Organization number 9397030), an Iran-flagged products tanker. On October 14 and 15 it drifted in a loop for 4.3 hours at 0 to 1.4 knots, about 0.65 nautical miles from the 2Africa corridor. On October 15 it switched off its Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponder inside the 2Africa and Bay of Bengal Gateway corridors off Sohar and stayed dark for 86 hours. It reappeared on October 19 and anchored off Shinas. It was empty.
- An unnamed very large gas carrier, sanctioned by the US Treasury in April 2026 along with its Panama-based owner. On October 23 it left Shinas for Pasir Gudang, Malaysia, carrying about 494,500 barrels of liquefied petroleum gas. Roughly ten hours later it slowed below 3 knots for 42 minutes inside the 2Africa corridor, turned 180 degrees back toward Oman and went dark about 2 nautical miles from the AAE-1 cable. As of October 28 it had been dark for five days.
- An unnamed Iran-flagged very large crude carrier operated by the National Iranian Tanker Company, which Treasury sanctioned in 2020. It loitered at under 1 knot for about ten days in Iran’s exclusive economic zone between Jask and Chabahar, 0.4 to 3 nautical miles from four cable routes. It went dark repeatedly and has been dark since October 26. It was also empty.
- A 34-meter Iran-flagged vessel that Windward classes as a fishing-support boat. From October 21 to 24 it moved at 0.1 to 0.5 knots along the Europe India Gateway and Transworld routes, holding 0.4 to 1.7 nautical miles from Transworld for about 30 hours.
Windward argues that cargo logistics do not explain the moves: two tankers were empty, the gas carrier was already bound for Malaysia, and the small boat carried nothing. The company says the pattern of sailing normally until a cable corridor, then slowing, looping or going dark, “fit[s] the profile of mapping cable routes or placing charges on them while dark.”
A tanker already known to Washington
The Office of Foreign Assets Control’s sanctions list carries the same registration number, 9397030, under the name Harmony, with Indian national Jugwinder Singh Brar listed as having an interest in the vessel. Maritime Executive reported that the tanker was sanctioned in April 2025 while operating as Harmony. On May 20, 2026, US Central Command said Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit boarded the Celestial Sea in the Gulf of Oman by helicopter and ordered it to change course on suspicion of trying to run the US blockade of Iran. The Financial Times, as reported by Ynetnews, named its owner as Glory International FZ, which did not respond to the newspaper’s request for comment.
Tehran’s stated threats
Iranian officials have made the threat themselves. On October 19, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) spokesman Hossein Mohebbi said: “Seven major undersea internet cables run through the Strait of Hormuz, carrying all commercial and internet data.” He added that “new targets and new weapons shall be unveiled.” On October 12, Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, warned that cables and data centers could be attacked if the war resumed, according to reports cited by Windward and Ynetnews. On October 21, Yadollah Javani, political deputy to the IRGC commander, warned of retaliation against the Hormuz cables if Iran’s infrastructure were hit, according to the Tasnim news agency as cited by Windward.
One detail in Tehran’s message does not match the public record. The cable research firm TeleGeography counts six cables through the Strait of Hormuz, not seven, with three more, including 2Africa, under construction, according to the Financial Times.
What is proven and what is not
Established: the vessels’ positions, speeds and dark periods as recorded by Windward; the sanctions history of Celestial Sea and of the tanker operator; and the Iranian officials’ public statements.
Not established: any intent to survey or sabotage the cables. That reading is Windward’s interpretation, and the company itself hedges it. Its report notes that “vessels waiting off Shinas sit near the cables anyway,” that the small boat’s area “is a busy fishing ground,” and that “nothing public ties the company” owning that boat to the Iranian state. Windward says further loitering would “confirm a pattern rather than a coincidence,” which concedes the current evidence does not yet do so. Sidharth Kaushal, a naval specialist at the Royal United Services Institute, told the Financial Times, according to Ynetnews, that the movements “could be coincidental,” while adding that Iran may be trying to show it can damage undersea infrastructure if war returns.
Readers should also weigh the source: Windward sells maritime intelligence services, and its blog post is both analysis and marketing. Its raw track data is not public.
Why it matters
Windward points to past cases, including the cargo ship Saviz, in which Iran used commercial hulls for intelligence work. Masha Kotkin, a former State Department official now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said cable damage would mean slower internet and financial transactions, as quoted by Asharq Al-Awsat. For the US ships enforcing the blockade, an empty tanker that slows over a cable route is now a security question as well as a sanctions one.
Sources
- Windward, “Sanctioned Iran-Linked Tankers Went Dark Over Gulf of Oman Cables as the IRGC Threatened Them” (October 29, 2026): windward.ai
- Ynetnews, “Iran-linked ships spotted hovering over subsea internet cables after threats, report says” (November 6, 2026), reporting the Financial Times: ynetnews.com
- Asharq Al-Awsat, “Iran-Linked Ships Hover Over Subsea Cables in Gulf of Oman” (November 8, 2026): english.aawsat.com
- Maritime Executive, “Video: U.S. Forces Board and Redirect Iranian Product Tanker” (May 20, 2026): maritime-executive.com
- OpenSanctions record of the Office of Foreign Assets Control listing for HARMONY (IMO 9397030): opensanctions.org
Image: submarine cable sections on display at the DOX centre in Prague. Photo by nan palmero, via Flickr, licensed CC BY 2.0.
How this article was made: Right Side News researched and drafted this article with the help of AI tools. Sources are linked so readers can check them. Spot an error? Tell us in the comments and we will correct it.
