COR v Defence Secretary: ARAP Guard Must Await MoD Review

A former guard at the British Embassy in Kabul waited nearly three years for a first decision on his relocation application. The High Court has now told him he must wait for an internal review that the Ministry of Defence says takes 18 to 24 months in complex cases, because letting him skip the line would be unfair to the thousands ahead of him.

The High Court in London has refused an Afghan former embassy security guard permission to challenge the Ministry of Defence’s rejection of his relocation application, ruling that he must first complete the department’s own internal review, even though the Ministry told the court it still had more than 3,500 such reviews outstanding. In R (COR) v Secretary of State for Defence [2026] EWHC 2655 (Admin), handed down on 19 October 2026, Mr Justice Bourne held that the review process “does provide a suitable alternative remedy and that permission should be refused for that reason” (judgment, para. 25).

The claimant, identified only as COR, guarded the British Embassy in Kabul from 2008 to June 2020 under contracts with the security companies G4S and GardaWorld (para. 1). He applied under the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) on 23 February 2022. The Ministry’s final refusal came on 15 May 2025, after he had issued one set of judicial review proceedings to force a decision at all (paras. 2 to 3). His request for a review followed four days later. The Ministry’s own estimate for that review decision was “in or around late Autumn 2026”, described in the judgment as “estimated (but not guaranteed)” (para. 8).

The ruling is short, and on its own terms it is careful. Read alongside the Ministry’s published performance figures and a second High Court judgment from August, it shows a relocation scheme that has closed its doors to new applicants but is still working through its paperwork at a pace well below the targets it set for itself.

What the coverage has missed

The ruling has so far drawn attention mainly from specialist immigration lawyers. Free Movement, the immigration law site, reported it on 4 November under the headline that ARAP reviews are a suitable remedy “despite 3,500 case backlog”. That is accurate, but it treats the backlog as the background. On RSN’s reading, the more useful story is in what the Ministry’s own numbers say about how long that backlog takes to clear.

The Ministry has published quarterly ARAP transparency data since February 2026. The August 2026 release sets targets for “complex” reviews (the category the Ministry says COR’s case falls into): 60% decided within 9 months, 95% within 18 months and 100% within 24 months. Its reported performance against those targets, for reviews received since September 2023, is 11.3% within 9 months, 21.2% within 18 months and 32.0% within 24 months. The release does not explain how reviews that have not yet reached the 24-month mark are counted, so the figures should be read with some care. On any reading, they fall far short of a target that promised every complex review would be decided within two years.

Non-complex reviews do better, but still miss their marks: 53.9% decided within 6 months against a 60% target, and 56.2% within 12 months against a 100% target. The same release records 18,540 ARAP review requests received to date and 14,733 decided. The difference, 3,807, is RSN’s own arithmetic and may not match the Ministry’s definition of “outstanding”, but it is broadly consistent with the “over 3,500” figure the Ministry gave the court.

Background: a scheme closed, a queue still open

ARAP opened on 1 April 2021, a few months before the Taliban took Kabul in August of that year. Its purpose was to offer relocation to Afghans who had worked for or alongside the British government and faced risk as a result. The danger was visible years earlier. An Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessment RSN published in August 2016 reported Taliban militants “successfully expanding their territorial control across several regions of Afghanistan”, and a follow-up that November judged that Afghan forces could not secure cities such as Lashkar Gah or Kunduz “without significant U.S. support”.

The scheme closed to new applications at 3pm on 1 July 2025, according to the Ministry’s transparency data. Two weeks later, on 15 July 2025, Defence Secretary John Healey told the House of Commons that “none of these relocation schemes can carry on in perpetuity, nor were they conceived to do so” (Hansard, 15 July 2025). He added: “However, I reiterate the commitment that we made then to processing every outstanding ARAP application and relocating those who might prove eligible.”

The same statement disclosed that in February 2022 a defence official had emailed a spreadsheet containing personal information on 18,714 Afghans who had applied to ARAP or an earlier scheme, which led to a secret relocation route and a super-injunction that was lifted that day. That breach is not mentioned in the COR judgment, although the judgment’s postscript records that COR’s case “was not considered under the separate exercise known as Afghanistan Response Route or ARR”, the route created after the breach, and that he has since been given an explanation (para. 32).

The Conservative frontbench supported the closures. Shadow Defence Secretary James Cartlidge told MPs: “Although we must recognise the huge role played by Afghan nationals in support of our armed forces, any policy in this area must always be balanced against our own national interest. We support the Government in closing the ARR scheme, as we did with their decision to close the full ARAP programme.”

Inside the judgment

COR’s refusal turned on what lawyers call Category 4 of ARAP. It covers people who provided services under contract to a UK government department, or worked alongside one, and who “made a substantive and positive contribution” to the UK’s military or national security objectives (paras. 4 and 12). The Ministry accepted that COR had provided relevant services. It refused him because, in the words of the decision letter quoted in the judgment, “the Decision Maker is satisfied that you were not working directly on the UK Government’s national security objectives” (para. 5).

His counsel, Edward Nicholson, argued that the word “directly” does not appear in the Immigration Rules and that the Ministry had applied the wrong legal test. He compared the case to an earlier ruling in which the High Court quashed an ARAP refusal for exactly that kind of error (para. 13). He also argued that the review timescales, “though nobody’s fault”, made the review ineffective as a remedy, and that a lack of resources could not justify that (paras. 15 and 17).

For the Ministry, Cathryn McGahey KC took a single point: the pending review was a suitable alternative remedy (para. 10). She told the court that “there are still over 3,500 ARAP review decisions outstanding” and that the timescale was “the best that can be achieved with the resources that are realistically available” (para. 20). She warned that allowing challenges before review would invite thousands more, noting that “Just between January and March 2026, 3,232 original applications have been refused” (para. 21).

Mr Justice Bourne sided with the Ministry. He was “not persuaded that this case necessarily turns on a point of law”, reasoning that the Ministry would have to explain, as a matter of fact, why COR’s contractor status meant he failed the contribution test (para. 26). He then wrote: “It follows that permitting judicial review would involve a jumping of the queue and might well divert the Defendant’s stretched resources away from those who are ahead of the Claimant in the queue” (para. 28).

On the floodgates argument, which courts usually treat with suspicion, he was direct: “Given the dangers faced by those in Afghanistan and the scale of the ARAP exercise, there are a great many people who would have a strong incentive to follow the route which the Claimant has sought to follow” (para. 29). He refused permission “while not belittling in any way the concerns expressed by and for the Claimant” (para. 30), and made no order on costs for now (para. 31). Part of the case was heard in closed session under the Justice and Security Act 2013, with a special advocate acting for COR, though the judge said he did not need to refer to that material (para. 33).

One detail of timing stands out. The hearing took place on 28 April 2026. The judgment was handed down on 19 October 2026, close to six months later, in a case whose central complaint was delay.

The other embassy guard case

COR is not the only former embassy guard to reach the High Court. In R (CBC and GSD) v Secretary of State for Defence and another [2026] EWHC 2147 (Admin), handed down on 11 August 2026, Mr Justice Garnham considered two more former guards at the Kabul embassy whose ARAP applications had been refused on the same “substantive and positive contribution” ground.

That case went further than COR’s because permission was granted and the claim was heard in full. The judgment sets out internal government evidence on how the guards were treated. Mr James Montagu, a deputy director in the Ministry’s Afghan resettlement directorate, said in a witness statement that embassy guards “were expressly considered and were not intended to fall into Category 4” (para. 42). He described a deliberate design: “The design of both schemes recognised the imperative of keeping a firm control over the numbers of persons who could be viably resettled in the UK” (para. 43, quoting his statement).

The court also quoted a Foreign Office information note dated 18 January 2022. Referring to G4S guards who protected the embassy before GardaWorld took over the contract, it said: “These individuals are not eligible for resettlement under ARAP, nor will they be included in those groups sponsored for resettlement under ACRS in year 1…. We believe this is defensible: we owe no obligation, we are not aware of these groups being at heightened risk, and we cannot resettle all who would like to come to the UK” (para. 46). ACRS is the Afghan Citizens Resettlement Scheme, a separate capped route.

Mr Justice Garnham dismissed three of the four grounds. He upheld one: the departments had internal guidance, the “Category Four (Cat 4) Operational Guidance” dated 20 June 2023, that they did not disclose to applicants. He found this “suggests a lack of transparency which is inconsistent with the proper exercise of executive power” (para. 128) and wrote that the guidance “should have been made available to all applicants under Category 4” (para. 128). The judgment states that both refusals are quashed and remitted for reconsideration (para. 134).

The claimants’ solicitors, Deighton Pierce Glynn, have since said that the judge declined to include a quashing order in the final order and that their clients have applied for permission to appeal. RSN has not seen the sealed order and cannot confirm that account.

Counter-arguments

The case for the Ministry and the court is a serious one, and conservatives in particular have reasons to take it seriously.

First, queue fairness. A merits review is designed to sort cases in order and by urgency. If any applicant with a lawyer can move up by filing in the High Court, those without lawyers wait longer. Mr Justice Bourne’s reasoning protects people who are not in the courtroom. The review also allows expedition, and COR’s request for expedition was considered in July 2025 and refused on its merits (paras. 7 and 22).

Second, a review can do more than a court. Ms McGahey argued that review “provides a merits review which can achieve more than judicial review” and can consider new evidence up to the date of decision (para. 23). A judicial review would only decide whether the original decision was lawful; it would not grant relocation.

Third, the policy was meant to be narrow. The evidence in the CBC case shows that ministers chose to cap numbers and to direct certain guards to a different scheme. Whether or not one agrees, that is a legitimate decision for elected government, and Parliament’s frontbenches on both sides supported closing the schemes. Mr Healey told the Commons that 36,000 Afghans had been accepted through the various routes as of July 2025.

Fourth, the Ministry has not been idle. Its transparency data show 116,814 decisions on initial ARAP applications out of 117,007 received. The initial-application queue is close to cleared. The pressure point is now the review stage.

What is established, disputed and not established

Established (from the court records and official data):

The High Court refused COR permission for judicial review on 19 October 2026 because the pending ARAP review was a suitable alternative remedy (para. 25).
COR applied on 23 February 2022 and received a final refusal on 15 May 2025 (paras. 2 to 3).
The Ministry told the court there were “over 3,500” ARAP review decisions outstanding and that complex cases take 18 to 24 months (paras. 8 and 20).
The Ministry’s August 2026 data report 32.0% of complex reviews decided within 24 months, against a 100% target.
In the CBC case, the High Court found that non-disclosure of Category 4 guidance was unlawful (paras. 128 and 134).

Disputed:

Whether contractor guards at the Kabul embassy made a “substantive and positive contribution” to UK military or national security objectives. The Ministry says no; the claimants say yes. Neither court decided that question.
Whether the Ministry applied a test (“directly”) that is not in the Immigration Rules. COR’s counsel says it did; the court found the case would turn on facts, not law.
The effect of the final order in the CBC case, which the claimants’ solicitors say did not include a quashing order.

Not established:

Whether COR’s review has been decided. The Ministry’s estimate of late autumn 2026 has arrived; RSN has found no public record of a decision.
Whether COR faces a specific risk in Afghanistan. The judgment does not make findings on risk, and part of the case was heard in closed session.
Why the Ministry’s review performance falls so far below its targets. The data report the figures but not the causes.

What accountability would look like

This section is RSN analysis.

Publish the review queue in plain numbers. The transparency data report applications received and decided, but a single published figure for reviews outstanding, broken down by complex and non-complex, would let Parliament track progress without arithmetic.
Explain the missed targets. The Ministry set its own 24-month ceiling for complex reviews and reports meeting it in about a third of cases. The Defence Committee could ask for a written explanation and a date by which the queue will be cleared.
Publish the decision guidance. After the CBC ruling, every applicant still in the queue should be able to see the Category 4 Operational Guidance that decision-makers use. Secret criteria invite litigation, and litigation costs the taxpayer.
Account for legal costs. ARAP refusals have produced a steady stream of Administrative Court cases. A published annual figure for the Ministry’s legal costs on ARAP cases, including adverse costs orders, would show what slow and opaque decision-making is costing.
Hold the line on the closure, honestly. If the government’s position is that certain groups were never meant to qualify, it should say so openly, as its internal notes did, rather than leave applicants to discover it years later through litigation.

Sources: R (COR) v Secretary of State for Defence [2026] EWHC 2655 (Admin), National Archives; R (CBC and GSD) v Secretary of State for Defence [2026] EWHC 2147 (Admin), National Archives; Ministry of Defence, ARAP collection page and Transparency data for ARAP eligibility case working, August 2026; Hansard, House of Commons, Afghanistan statement, 15 July 2025; Free Movement, 4 November 2026; Deighton Pierce Glynn, 12 August 2026.

Featured image: Royal Courts of Justice main gate, London, by David Castor, released into the public domain (CC0) via Wikimedia Commons.

How this article was made: Right Side News researched and drafted this article with the help of AI tools. Sources are linked so readers can check them. Spot an error? Tell us in the comments and we will correct it.

High Court Tells Kabul Embassy Guard to Wait Out MoD Queue of 3,500 ARAP Reviews