The High Court has found that the Home Secretary acted unlawfully by stripping asylum seekers of their right to challenge decisions denying them protection as trafficking victims—a legal reversal that exposes systemic failures in the government’s trafficking identification processes and its prioritization of removal targets over statutory safeguards.
Mr. Justice Sheldon issued his judgment on July 10, 2026, in a case brought by five asylum seekers (four from Eritrea, one from Sudan) who were earmarked for removal under the government’s “one in, one out” deal with France. The court found that amendments made to Home Office guidance in September 2025 violated both the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the UK’s obligations under the European Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (ECAT).
The Policy Change That Prompted Legal Challenge
In September 2025, the Home Office quietly revised its guidance on modern slavery and human trafficking identification. The change removed asylum seekers’ ability to request reconsideration of negative “Reasonable Grounds” or “Conclusive Grounds” decisions where the Home Secretary intended to remove them to France—a signatory nation under ECAT.
The timing was not coincidental. The guidance revision came as judicial review challenges mounted against planned removals under the government’s flagship migration deal with the French government. By eliminating the reconsideration mechanism, the Home Office effectively created a one-way process: once an initial negative decision was made, victims had no formal avenue to challenge it before removal.
What the Court Found
Justice Sheldon’s judgment is unsparing in its assessment of the government’s conduct. The court found that the arrangement—which instructed decision-makers to disregard relevant evidence and representations about trafficking victim status—was unlawful and deprived victims of a “robust and effective process for victim identification.”
The judgment emphasizes that the Home Office’s approach violated section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, which creates a statutory duty to identify potential trafficking victims. Critically, the court noted that the government’s revised guidance did not merely streamline procedure; it systematically undermined the identification regime’s foundational premise: that decision-makers should have access to all potentially decisive information.
Evidence of Systemic Identification Failure
Perhaps the most damning evidence in the judgment concerns the accuracy of initial trafficking determinations. According to court findings, in 2025, 79 percent of individuals initially deemed not to be trafficking victims received a positive decision upon reconsideration.
This statistic reveals a pattern suggesting that the Home Office’s initial decisions are frequently incorrect—a finding that contradicts claims by ministers that rapid initial assessments are sufficiently reliable to form the basis of irreversible removal decisions. If four of every five initial negative determinations are reversed upon more careful review, the question of institutional competence becomes inescapable.
The Home Office’s own data, presented to the court, thus becomes evidence of systemic institutional failure rather than procedural efficiency. The government attempted to justify the removal of reconsideration rights by citing administrative burden and removal timeline pressures. The court rejected this reasoning, finding that administrative convenience cannot override statutory protections against trafficking.
Scope of the Breach
The court determined that the Home Office’s revised guidance breached multiple layers of protective obligation:
- Statutory duty under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to identify potential victims
- Treaty obligations under ECAT, which requires signatory nations to identify trafficking victims and provide protective measures
- Human rights obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly the right to protection from slavery and forced labor (Article 4)
Justice Sheldon noted that the removal of reconsideration rights was particularly problematic where the identification system itself—the initial “Reasonable Grounds” decision—is rapid and may lack extensive procedural safeguards. Under such conditions, a meaningful reconsideration process is not a luxury but an essential check on error.
Government Response and Appeal
The Home Office has confirmed plans to appeal the ruling. A spokesperson stated: “Last-minute modern slavery claims must not be used to frustrate the removal of illegal migrants.” The statement reiterates the government’s position that trafficking victim identification must not impede its removal targets—a position the High Court has now rejected.
The appeal is expected, given the judgment’s direct confrontation with a centerpiece of the government’s migration policy architecture. However, the appeal path is uncertain. The Court of Appeal would need to overturn not merely the procedural ruling but Justice Sheldon’s factual findings regarding the systematic unreliability of initial trafficking determinations and the Home Office’s breach of statutory duty.
Institutional Accountability and the Rule of Law
The judgment raises broader questions about how migration enforcement objectives interact with statutory protections and international treaty obligations. The High Court’s ruling indicates that the Home Office’s priority—removing migrants faster—cannot be achieved through procedures that systematically disable victim identification mechanisms.
This represents a constraint the government appears not to have anticipated. The “one in, one out” deal with France was presented as a workable solution to irregular migration; the trafficking judgment suggests that workability depends on procedures that withstand scrutiny under law. Where convenience and legality conflict, the court has ruled, legality prevails.
Implications for Future Policy
The judgment leaves the Home Office with limited options. It may appeal (likely unsuccessfully) or reinstate reconsideration procedures—thereby extending the identification process and reducing the efficiency of removals. There is no middle path that combines rapid removals with compliance with the court’s statutory and treaty-based findings.
For the five claimants, the judgment restores a legal pathway for challenging initial trafficking assessments before removal. For the broader asylum system, it signals that institutional failures in victim identification cannot be remedied through procedural elimination. The government must identify victims correctly or provide victims with the procedural means to contest incorrect identification.
The Home Office’s attempt to prioritize administrative expediency over statutory compliance has resulted in a clear judicial rejection. That rejection raises an uncomfortable question for policymakers: if the identification system is so unreliable that 79 percent of initial negative decisions are reversed, how many trafficking victims has the government removed unlawfully under the September 2025 guidance?