A divided D.C. Circuit panel has refused to put its June ruling on hold, so the Pentagon cannot discharge the transgender service members who sued over the Hegseth policy. In about two weeks the Supreme Court will meet to decide whether it will hear the government’s appeal.
On Tuesday, November 17, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the Trump administration’s request to delay its decision in Talbott v. United States. The one-page per curiam order told the clerk “to issue the mandate forthwith.” The result is that a preliminary injunction now takes effect, barring the Department of Defense from expelling the currently serving plaintiffs under the policy issued by Secretary Pete Hegseth in February 2025. In the government’s words, that policy “generally disqualifies from military service individuals who have gender dysphoria, a history of the condition, or a history of related interventions.”
The vote was 2–1. Senior Judge Judith Rogers and Judge Robert Wilkins formed the majority, and Wilkins attached a seven-page statement. A footnote records that Judge Justin Walker “would grant this motion.” On the same day, the Supreme Court’s docket shows that the government’s petition in the case, United States v. Talbott (No. 26-272), was distributed for the justices’ December 4 conference.
What most coverage misses
Headlines described the order as an appeals court “blocking” the Pentagon. That is accurate, but it leaves out three points that matter for what happens next.
First, Tuesday’s order did not decide the merits. That happened on June 1, 2026. The government asked on July 16 for the court to hold its mandate (the formal order sending a case back to the trial court) while it sought Supreme Court review. The panel took four months to answer, and its answer came on the same day the petition was sent to the justices.
Second, the injunction is narrow. It covers only named plaintiffs who are already serving. The June decision vacated the trial court’s order as it applied to everyone else, including plaintiffs who wanted to enlist. The plaintiffs’ brief in opposition puts the number at 28; their lawyers gave the Associated Press a figure of 27, according to AP’s report. RSN could not reconcile the two figures from the public record. The policy itself remains in force across the armed forces.
Third, the core dispute is less about transgender service than about who decides. The government’s position, and Judge Walker’s, is that courts should defer to the political branches on the composition of the armed forces. The majority’s position is that deference does not extend to a policy it found was not rationally connected to any legitimate interest. That question is what the Supreme Court is being asked to settle.
Background: ten years of reversals
Military policy on transgender service has changed with every administration since 2016. Judge Walker’s dissent summarizes the sequence. Before 2016, military rules “effectively banned all transgender persons from either joining or remaining in the military.” In 2016, Defense Secretary Ash Carter opened service to transgender individuals who met military standards, a change RSN covered at the time in “Secretary of Defense Stumbles into Transgender Legal Morass”.
In 2018, Secretary Jim Mattis restored a more restrictive approach while exempting people who had relied on the 2016 policy. President Biden reversed that in 2021. President Trump reversed it again with Executive Order 14183 on January 27, 2025.
The Hegseth policy followed on February 26, 2025. Lawsuits came quickly. In Washington, D.C., U.S. District Judge Ana Reyes granted a preliminary injunction on March 18, 2025. Her opinion, as quoted in the June appellate ruling, found the ban “soaked in animus and dripping with pretext.” A separate federal court in Washington State issued a universal injunction in Shilling v. United States.
On May 6, 2025, the Supreme Court stayed the Shilling injunction in full, which allowed the policy to take effect. The D.C. Circuit then stayed Judge Reyes’s injunction pending appeal. According to the government’s certiorari petition, Judge Gregory Katsas, joined by Judge Neomi Rao, wrote at that stage that the policy “is likely constitutional because it reflects a considered judgment of military leaders and furthers legitimate military interests.” Judge Cornelia Pillard dissented, calling it “a complete ban on military service by transgender individuals.”
A different three-judge panel heard the full appeal on January 22, 2026, and ruled on June 1. The panel split three ways and produced no single majority opinion. Wilkins and Rogers agreed that the plaintiffs are likely to win on equal protection. Wilkins and Walker agreed that the injunction should not cover people trying to enlist. Wilkins and Rogers agreed that it should cover people already serving.
Deep dive: what the judges wrote
The June decision
Judge Wilkins’s controlling opinion noted that the government “has not contested” that the currently serving plaintiffs, who “have collectively earned more than 80 commendations,” have “served honorably and pose no threat to national security.” He concluded that the policy “goes far beyond disqualifying persons currently or recently suffering from gender dysphoria.” He also wrote that its sharp departure from the Mattis approach “appears to be driven by the bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group.” On that basis, he found it likely “both arbitrary and based upon animus” at the preliminary stage.
Judge Walker’s dissent opens with a quotation from the late Judge Stephen Williams in a 2019 D.C. Circuit case. Williams wrote that in the military “there is no constitutional right for, say, biological males who identify as female to live, sleep, shower, and train with biological females,” and that the question “is of no concern to the courts; that is a question for the people acting through their elected representatives.” Walker wrote that the Supreme Court has allowed the military to limit free speech, free exercise, due process, the right to counsel and equal protection in ways that might not be allowed for civilians. He wrote that the plaintiffs could not identify “a single binding precedent” holding that the Constitution dictates the make-up of the forces against the wishes of the political branches. “Not one,” he added.
Walker found that the policy “has a legitimate grounding in national security concerns.” He described the majority’s ruling as an “unprecedented intervention into military affairs” and explained his dissent this way: “because the plaintiffs are service members not civilians, and because we are judges not generals, I respectfully dissent.” His conclusion quotes Justice Robert Jackson from 1953: “judges are not given the task of running the Army.” Walker added: “The Supreme Court has never assumed that role for itself. Neither has the D.C. Circuit. Not until today.”
Tuesday’s statement
Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(d)(1), a party seeking to hold the mandate must show that its petition would “present a substantial question” and that there is “good cause for a stay.” Wilkins wrote that the government failed the second test. In his words, it “has not alleged any irreparable harm that will result from retention of the currently serving Plaintiffs.” He added that the Department “has never specified—before the District Court, on appeal, or now in its motion to stay—what national security ‘risks’ will follow from retaining the serving Plaintiffs.”
He distinguished the Supreme Court’s 2025 Shilling stay. That case involved a universal injunction against both retention and enlistment, while this injunction “has been narrowed to cover only a limited group of currently serving Plaintiffs.” He also rejected the idea that blocking any executive policy is itself irreparable harm, writing that “it cannot be that a mere assertion of executive prerogative suffices to show irreparable harm.”
Much of the statement answers the government’s reliance on West Virginia v. B.P.J., the Supreme Court’s 2026 decision holding that schools may restrict “eligibility for women’s and girls’ sports based on biological sex.” The government argued that B.P.J. “casts doubt” on the panel’s analysis because it judges a policy by “the general problem” rather than individual cases. Wilkins disagreed. He said B.P.J. involved a sex-based line the challengers conceded was valid for “most biological males,” while Talbott asks whether the Hegseth classifications are valid at all.
His central example was the policy’s bar on waivers for anyone who has “attempted to” transition. The government conceded in the trial court that this covers social transition. According to the panel, that means a servicemember could be expelled over clothing once worn or pronouns once used. As an illustration, the panel’s June opinion pointed to a “biological woman wearing slacks and a tie.” Wilkins also quoted B.P.J.‘s own hypothetical, which said barring “all transgender individuals” from a co-ed team “would be a distinct transgender classification,” and wrote: “That is the Hegseth Policy in a nutshell.”
The government’s case at the Supreme Court
Solicitor General D. John Sauer filed the petition on August 27, 2026. It asks whether that policy violates the equal-protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. It calls the D.C. Circuit’s holding “gravely erroneous.” It also argues that the question keeps recurring: the Supreme Court stayed injunctions against the similar Mattis policy in 2019 and against the Hegseth policy in 2025.
The government’s reply brief, filed November 16, makes three main points. First, the policy turns on “a medical condition (gender dysphoria) and related interventions,” not on transgender status. Second, the Carter, Mattis and Austin policies all treated gender dysphoria as potentially disqualifying, and the Carter and Austin policies acknowledged that transition while serving “presents unique challenges.” Third, “under rational-basis review, the government had no obligation to produce any evidence below.” The reply argues that “alleged overbreadth falls far short of animus.” It also notes that the Court “stayed in full—including as to the individual respondents—a universal injunction against the same policy.”
Twenty-two states led by West Virginia, and a coalition of conservative groups that includes retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, filed friend-of-the-court briefs supporting the government. The plaintiffs, represented by the National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR), GLAD Law and O’Melveny & Myers, argue that review is premature. Their points: there is no split among the circuits, the ruling is interim, and a trial before Judge Reyes is set for January 4, 2027. A spokesperson for Hegseth’s office declined to comment on Tuesday’s ruling, according to AP.
Counter-arguments and complications
RSN analysis. The government’s strongest argument is institutional rather than factual. The Supreme Court has repeatedly given “great deference” to military personnel judgments, in cases such as Goldman v. Weinberger (1986) and Rostker v. Goldberg (1981), the draft-registration case RSN discussed in “Congress Should Challenge Myths About Women, Combat, and the Draft”. The justices have already let this policy take effect once. If they apply the same reasoning in a full review, the D.C. Circuit’s ruling is unlikely to survive.
The strongest point on the other side comes from the government’s own record. Under rational-basis review, the government does not have to prove its case with evidence. But it also did not dispute that the serving plaintiffs met every standard. And on appeal it never named a specific harm from keeping them. In the stay posture, that silence was decisive for two of the three judges. The government’s legal position may still be right, but a narrow injunction covering about two dozen people with service records is a hard vehicle for showing urgent harm.
There is also a timing problem. If the Court grants review in December, a decision would probably come by mid-2027, after the January trial. The government’s reply says a grant “would signal to the district court that it should stay a trial that should not be happening in the first place.” The plaintiffs say a final judgment could make the preliminary ruling moot. Both sides have a point; the Court has reviewed preliminary injunctions before despite similar risks.
Finally, Shilling is not settled. The Ninth Circuit heard the government’s appeal in October 2025. It later asked for supplemental briefing on B.P.J. and said it would schedule reargument “in due course,” according to the petition. Two appeals courts are therefore still working on the same policy.
What is established, disputed and not established
Established (from court records):
- The D.C. Circuit denied the government’s motion to stay its mandate on November 17, 2026, with Judge Walker voting to grant it.
- The June 1, 2026 decision kept the injunction only for named plaintiffs already serving and vacated it for those seeking to enlist.
- The government’s certiorari petition (No. 26-272) is set for the Supreme Court’s December 4, 2026 conference.
- The Supreme Court stayed the separate Shilling injunction on May 6, 2025, and the Hegseth policy remains in effect for everyone not covered by the Talbott injunction.
Disputed:
- Whether the policy classifies by a medical condition (the government) or by gender identity (the panel majority).
- Whether the policy reflects animus, as Judges Wilkins, Rogers and Reyes found, or “a considered judgment of military leaders,” as Judges Katsas and Walker concluded.
- Whether West Virginia v. B.P.J. undercuts or supports the panel’s reasoning.
Not established:
- Whether the policy is unconstitutional. Every ruling so far is preliminary; no court has entered final judgment.
- The exact number of plaintiffs covered: 28 per the plaintiffs’ Supreme Court brief, 27 per their lawyers’ statement to AP.
- Any specific readiness or security harm from retaining these plaintiffs. The government has not identified one in this litigation, and the plaintiffs have not been shown to fall short of any military standard.
What accountability would look like
- For the Pentagon: put its readiness case on the record, with data on deployability, medical time lost and cost, rather than relying only on deference. If the evidence exists, the January trial is the place to present it.
- For Congress: settle the question in statute. Ten years of policy swings by executive order and memo have left service members and commanders with no stable rule. Congress has the constitutional power to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”
- For the courts: decide promptly. The D.C. Circuit took four months to rule on a motion to hold its mandate. Whatever the Supreme Court does on December 4, the parties and the services need a clear answer on which standard governs.
- For readers: read the documents. The June opinion, Tuesday’s order and both Supreme Court briefs are linked below and are short enough to check.
For related coverage, see RSN’s report on the Supreme Court taking up Mullin v. RAICES after a D.C. Circuit asylum ruling and on the House vote on impeaching Secretary Hegseth.
Sources: D.C. Circuit order and Wilkins statement, No. 25-5087 (Nov. 17, 2026); Talbott v. United States, D.C. Circuit opinions (June 1, 2026); Petition for certiorari, No. 26-272; Brief in opposition; Government reply brief; Supreme Court docket No. 26-272; Associated Press via WJLA (Nov. 17, 2026).
Featured image: E. Barrett Prettyman Federal Courthouse, Washington, D.C., home of the D.C. Circuit. Photo by Carol M. Highsmith, Highsmith Archive, Library of Congress. No known restrictions on publication.
How this article was made: Right Side News researched and drafted this article with the help of AI tools. Sources are linked so readers can check them. Spot an error? Tell us in the comments and we will correct it.
