Section 48 of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 took effect on October 1. The public record shows a long road to a rule that ministers described as necessary in 2023, and a measurement problem that the rule does not solve.
On October 1, 2026, the legal duty to check a worker’s right to work in the United Kingdom was extended beyond traditional employees to people engaged under worker contracts, as individual sub-contractors, and through online matching platforms. The measure is Section 48 of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025, brought into force by regulation 2 of the Commencement No. 4 Regulations 2026 (S.I. 2026/683). It closes a gap that a Home Office minister named in writing in November 2023.
The headline is straightforward: the law now reaches the delivery-app and subcontracting economy. The more instructive story sits in the record around it. The state relied on voluntary commitments for roughly two and a half years, published its final operating guidance on the day the law took effect, and still describes its enforcement success in terms of activity, not prevalence. That is a narrower failure than the political rhetoric on either side suggests, and it is documented.
What the law now does
Under the old regime, a civil penalty for illegal working attached to an “employer” who employed someone under a contract of employment. Section 48 amends the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 to widen that definition. The Home Office’s final employer’s guide states that an employer now includes a person who employs an individual “under a worker’s contract, as an individual sub-contractor, or when operating as an online matching service providing the details of an individual who is a service provider to potential clients or customers.”
The guide gives a worked example that matters for the gig economy. A delivery platform, it says, “is the individual’s employer for the purposes of the Right to Work Scheme,” even where the platform describes its couriers as independent contractors. It also draws a boundary: the guidance does not apply to individuals “operating an independent business either in their own name or through their own company” who contract directly with clients or customers.
Liability can also extend along supply chains. A person in a contractual chain can establish a statutory excuse only by meeting three requirements set out in the guide: written contractual terms confirming that checks are done, controls on worker substitution, and verification that the individual doing the work is the individual who was checked. The transition rule is limited. A civil penalty may be imposed under the new categories only where the employment began on or after October 1, 2026, according to the guide, and the supply-chain requirements apply to contractual arrangements entered into on or after that date.
The penalty scale is set out in the Home Office’s Code of Practice on preventing illegal working (the version dated June 30). It gives a starting point of £45,000 per worker for a first breach and £60,000 for a repeat breach, with reductions of £5,000 per worker for reporting and for cooperation on a first breach. Some law-firm commentary describes £60,000 as the maximum; the Code’s wording is a starting point for the calculation.
The record: from letter to law
The sequence of official statements is the part of this story that most coverage omits.
- November 14, 2023. Immigration Minister Robert Jenrick wrote to Uber Eats, Deliveroo and Just Eat. According to the published letter: “The practice of allowing account holders to substitute work to other individuals completely unknown to your business, potentially including illegal workers, must end.”
- April 30, 2024. Ministers met the three platforms. The Home Office announcement recorded that Deliveroo had rolled out a substitute registration feature with direct right-to-work checks, Uber Eats would deploy identity verification for substitutions, and Just Eat was developing a solution. These were company commitments, not legal duties.
- December 2, 2025. The Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 received Royal Assent, according to Kingsley Napley. Section 48 was not in force at Royal Assent.
- October 29 to December 10, 2025. The Home Office ran a six-week consultation on extending the scheme. Its response reports 340 usable responses and commits to “sufficient time before any new requirements come into force.”
- September 11, 2026. A draft employer’s guide dated September 11 was published, per the gov.uk publication page.
- October 1, 2026. The same page’s update history records “Final employer RTW guidance added for 1 October,” the day Section 48 took effect.
Taken together, that is just under three years from a ministerial demand to a statutory duty, and about three weeks between the draft and final versions of the operating guidance. The consultation response promised time to adapt. Whether three weeks counts as “sufficient time” is a judgment the record cannot settle; employers, particularly those in sectors that raised concerns in the consultation about short-term and agency engagements, are best placed to say. What the record does establish is that the final text of the operating guidance was published at the moment of commencement.
The delay is not attributable to one party. The voluntary phase ran under a Conservative government; the statute was passed, and commenced, under a Labour one. A conservative reading of the record should say so plainly: the loophole was identified by a Conservative minister, left to voluntary company action, and closed in law by the following government.
What the enforcement numbers show, and what they do not
The Home Office’s enforcement release to the end of June 2026 reports that between January 1 and June 30, 2026, Immigration Enforcement carried out 7,270 illegal working visits resulting in 4,756 arrests, increases of 31 percent and 20 percent on the same period of 2025. More than 1,200 businesses were issued civil penalties, with fines of over £74 million. In the warehousing, distribution and delivery sector, the release reports 635 visits and 635 arrests in the half-year, up 147 percent and 70 percent on the prior year, and almost 2,000 arrests in that sector over two years.
These are real operational figures, and they show enforcement activity rising sharply. But they measure what the Home Office did, not how much illegal working exists. Higher arrests can reflect more illegal working, better targeting, more resources, or some combination, and the release does not separate them. It also reports that of those arrested on illegal working visits between July 2024 and June 2026, 2,357 had been returned “so far” out of more than 17,000 arrests, which is fewer than one in seven. The release does not say what became of the remainder, so no conclusion about outcomes can be drawn from the figures alone.
The government’s own impact assessment is candid about the baseline problem. The final-stage impact assessment for Section 48 (dated May 7, 2025 and updated December 2, 2025) states that “due to the difficulty in estimating the exact size of the irregular population, the government has not produced any official estimates since 2005.” It reports “significant uncertainty” about how many additional working arrangements come into scope. Its scenarios range from 2.5 million to 5 million additional arrangements, with a central estimate of 3.75 million, set against a gig economy it puts at about 1.6 million people. The assessment’s central monetised net present social value is negative at £103 million over ten years.
A measure can be justified on grounds that do not reduce to a monetised return, and the integrity of immigration controls is plausibly one. But a policy with that justification still needs a way to show whether it works. On the published record, there is no official estimate of the illegal workforce to measure it against, which means that a falling or rising arrest count after October 1 will be open to opposite readings. The same measurement gap is a recurring feature of the department’s reporting; RSN examined a version of it in the asylum system in The Backlog That Moved, where a falling headline number concealed a growing queue elsewhere.
Opposing and complicating views
Supporters of the measure would say the 2023 and 2024 episodes prove that voluntary action was insufficient and that statutory liability was the correct answer. The government’s consultation response states that “the rules must be followed” and describes a system “in which there are no rewards for breaking the rules.” That is a defensible position, and the enforcement figures above show the department treating the sector as a priority.
Critics raise practical and legal objections that are also documented. The consultation response records respondents’ concerns about administrative burden for short-term and agency work, uncertainty over liability in supply chains, data protection when processing details of non-contracted workers, and the risk of reduced flexibility in engaging contractors. Law firm Kingsley Napley has noted that differing verification routes for British and Irish nationals could create indirect discrimination risk when checks extend to non-employees. These are concerns about implementation, not arguments against enforcing the law, but they bear directly on whether lawful workers face friction and whether compliant firms are penalised for ambiguity.
Implications
Three questions follow from the record, and each is one the Home Office is positioned to answer publicly.
First, whether platforms that adopted identity verification for substitutes in 2024 can show it reduced unchecked account use, and whether the department tested those claims before moving to statute. The public record shows commitments; it does not show verified results. Second, whether civil penalties will fall on large platforms and principal contractors, which can afford compliance, or predominantly on small subcontractors, which cannot. The June release reports business penalties in aggregate without a breakdown by size. Third, whether the department will publish an estimate, or at least a method, for the scale of illegal working so that the measure’s effect can eventually be judged.
The pattern is familiar from other Home Office matters RSN has covered: a stated policy objective, a process that runs behind it, and outcomes reported by activity rather than effect. The High Court’s findings on immigration detention safeguards and the Home Office’s retreat on its good-character citizenship policy involved different facts, but both turned on process and implementation, not on whether the objective was legitimate.
Extending the right-to-work duty to the platforms and supply chains that engage this labour is a reasonable and overdue step, and the legal framework is now in place. Accountability for it means something specific: published figures on penalties by firm size, a stated method for estimating the illegal workforce, and a review of whether the three-week gap between draft and final guidance left compliant businesses exposed. Those are modest requests, and the public record shows that the problem was named in writing nearly three years before the duty took effect.
What is proven, what is not
Established by primary documents: the text and commencement of Section 48; the content of the final guide and Code of Practice; the November 2023 letter; the April 2024 commitments; the consultation response; the impact assessment figures; and the Home Office’s published enforcement statistics. Not established here: how the platforms have changed their systems since October 1, how the Home Office will apply the new penalties in practice, and any causal link between enforcement activity and the level of illegal working. The Code of Practice figures are taken from the version dated June 30; the department may have issued a later version.
