A federal judge has vacated the Justice Department’s nationwide effort to collect state voter rolls and check them against a federal citizenship database. The goal, keeping noncitizens off the rolls, is lawful and required by statute. The ruling turns on how the Department pursued it, and the record it describes is a case study in how a legitimate objective is undermined by an institutional shortcut.
On October 9, 2026, U.S. District Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to Common Cause and four individual voters in Common Cause v. U.S. Department of Justice, No. 26-cv-1352 (D.D.C.). In a 78-page memorandum opinion, she set aside what the administrative record calls the Civil Rights Division’s “list maintenance project”: requesting unredacted statewide voter registration lists, sharing them with other agencies, running them through the Department of Homeland Security’s SAVE system, and asking states to remove the registrants flagged. On October 16, the Department told the court it had appealed to the D.C. Circuit and moved for a stay pending appeal.
Much coverage has framed the decision as a judge blocking election integrity, or as a court stopping a voter purge. Neither shorthand matches the opinion. The court did not hold that the federal government may not care who is on the rolls, and it expressly said its ruling “does not pave the way for ineligible voters to vote in our elections” (p. 3). It held that the Department lacked statutory authority for this particular program, built it on data it knew to be unreliable, and skipped privacy and paperwork procedures that Congress made mandatory. Those are failures of execution, and they are the subject of this analysis.
What the Department Did
According to the opinion, which draws its facts from the administrative record, the program grew out of Executive Order 14248 of March 25, 2025, which directed the Attorney General to pursue information-sharing agreements with state election officials and to prioritize enforcement against states that declined (pp. 8-9). Beginning in May 2025, the Civil Rights Division requested complete, unredacted voter lists, including full names, dates of birth, addresses, and driver’s license numbers or the last four digits of Social Security numbers, from 49 states and the District of Columbia. North Dakota, which has no voter registration, was not asked (pp. 9-10 & n.2).
At least 18 states fully complied. Others refused, and the Department sued. The court counted at least 25 federal district courts that have dismissed those enforcement suits, and one appellate affirmance by the Sixth Circuit (p. 10 n.3). Elsewhere the opinion states that the Department sued 30 states that refused to provide their lists (p. 45).
The lists the Division received were shared with DHS and run through SAVE, the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements system, which in 2025 was modified to draw on Social Security Administration records for the first time (p. 11). Under a separate arrangement, the Division agreed to provide state lists to Homeland Security Investigations, an ICE component, so that it could “enrich the SVRL datasets” with DHS records (p. 12). Memoranda of understanding with some states reserved the option to share the data with Department contractors (p. 13). Cooperating states, including Texas, agreed to “clean” their rolls within 45 days of notice from the Department (p. 13). The Department’s Office of Legal Counsel described the possible outcomes of a noncitizenship result as striking the person from the rolls, referring the person for prosecution, “or both” (p. 36).
The Data Problem the Department Knew About
The most consequential part of the record concerns accuracy. Social Security records capture a person’s citizenship when he or she applies for a number. They are generally not updated if that person later naturalizes or acquires citizenship through a parent, unless the person is receiving benefits. The SSA did not begin to maintain citizenship information consistently until 1981 (p. 12). A 2006 audit by the SSA’s Office of Inspector General, cited in the opinion, found that about 7 percent of records classifying people as noncitizens in fact described citizens, roughly 3.3 million people (p. 12). A 2023 SSA letter in the record states that about a quarter of its records carry no citizenship indication (p. 70).
The Department’s own agreement with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services acknowledged the limitation: “SAVE may only be able to verify acquired U.S. citizens in certain situations” (pp. 11-12). The opinion also quotes an earlier ruling describing an independent review in Travis County, Texas, which found that a quarter of the county’s noncitizen matches were people who had already proven citizenship (pp. 35-36).
The consequences in the record are specific. Plaintiff Anthony Nel, a derived citizen in Denton County, Texas, received a letter in October 2025 stating that SAVE had identified him as a noncitizen; his registration was cancelled after the modified system failed to confirm his citizenship, and was later reinstated, according to Courthouse News‘s account of his declaration (opinion p. 34). The court found the same happened to a naturalized Texas voter identified as Bailey Doe, and that another member had to produce documentary proof of citizenship after an erroneous result (pp. 34, 71).
On this record, the court held the policy arbitrary and capricious because the Department “entirely failed to consider” the risk of removing citizens. “[F]aced with that pitfall in their predetermined approach,” the court wrote, “the Division chose to look the other way” (p. 56).
Four Independent Grounds
Statutory authority. The Department relied on Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act. Title III lets the Attorney General demand election records, but the demand must “contain a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor” (52 U.S.C. § 20703). The form letters stated a purpose, to “ascertain” compliance with list-maintenance requirements, but in the court’s reading offered no factual basis for believing any state was out of compliance (p. 50). The NVRA and HAVA, the court held, place list maintenance with the states and give the Attorney General a civil enforcement action, not a right to the lists or a power to demand removals (pp. 52-55; see 52 U.S.C. § 20507; § 21083). The Department, the court wrote, “might think that it is a ‘forensic accountant using large-scale bank records to investigate potential fraud.’ But it may not take on that role vis-à-vis voter registration records without statutory authorization” (p. 54).
The Privacy Act. The Division added the voter files to a records system whose public notice dates to 2003 and covers, among others, “[s]ubjects of investigations” and “victims” (p. 60). The Department argued that every registrant is a subject of its voter fraud investigation, and every lawful voter a potential victim of dilution. The court rejected both: “No reasonable American would fathom that every voter in every corner of the country is a subject of a (seemingly perpetual) federal investigation merely for exercising their fundamental right to vote” (p. 60). It also held that bulk transfers to ICE and USCIS did not fit the routine uses the Department invoked, that the law-enforcement exception’s requirement of a “particular portion” of records does not permit handing over all of them (pp. 65-68), that disclosure to contractors was unsupported on this record and barred by Title III’s own confidentiality provision (pp. 62-65), that the Department made no reasonable effort to ensure accuracy (pp. 69-71), and that voter registration and party affiliation are First Amendment-protected records the Act forbids agencies to maintain without specific authorization (pp. 71-73; see 5 U.S.C. § 552a).
The Paperwork Reduction Act. Because the Department imposed the same reporting demand on every state as part of a general investigation, the court held the Act’s public-notice requirements applied, and the Department did not attempt to show compliance (pp. 73-76).
Remedy. The court vacated the policy under the Administrative Procedure Act, rejecting the argument that Trump v. CASA limits relief to the parties (pp. 76-77). It did not reach the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims (p. 76 n.20).
The Department’s Case
The Department’s position deserves a full statement, and its October 16 stay motion supplies one. Its threshold argument is that “[t]here is no such policy” (Mot. at 1): each state received a tailored request keyed to its own answers on the Election Assistance Commission’s administration survey, states responded differently, and the court assembled separate enforcement steps under a single label (Mot. at 3-5). The letters, it says, asked states to “please” provide data and compelled nothing (Mot. at 5). On Title III, it argues that “the basis and the purpose” is a legal doublet like “cease and desist,” and that investigative agencies may act “merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because [the agency] wants assurance that it is not,” quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co. (1950) (Mot. at 7).
Its strongest point concerns the Privacy Act. On September 25, 2026, the Supreme Court stayed the same judge’s earlier ruling against the modified SAVE system, concluding that the government was likely to prevail on its argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 authorized the changes; three Justices dissented (opinion p. 11 n.4). Section 1373 provides that, notwithstanding other law, no one may restrict a government entity from sending, receiving, maintaining, or exchanging information about immigration status. The Department argues that this reasoning controls here and that it raised § 1373 in its briefing, disputing the court’s statement that neither party argued it (Mot. at 8-9 & n.1). If the D.C. Circuit agrees, a significant part of the Privacy Act holding is at risk.
The Department also argues that it never removed anyone. States make removal decisions, several asked for supporting evidence rather than acting on a flag, and HAVA independently requires states to guard against erroneous removals (Mot. at 11-12). And it describes concrete costs of the vacatur: according to a supporting declaration, it can no longer compare state lists to identify people registered in more than one state, an issue distinct from citizenship (Mot. at 12).
These arguments have weight. The “no policy” argument sits uneasily with the record the court quotes, however, including the Department’s statement to the National Association of Secretaries of State that it “would not be negotiating 50 different MOUs” and would present a standard agreement (p. 44 n.12). And the “states decide” argument does not answer the accuracy finding: the cooperating states’ agreements committed them to act within 45 days of the Department’s notice, and the court found the Department knew its data could misidentify citizens.
What Is Proven, Disputed, and Not Established
- Documented in the opinion: the scope of the requests, the 18 cooperating states, the SAVE and HSI arrangements, the Department’s acknowledgment of SAVE’s limits on acquired citizens, the SSA data findings, and the court’s four grounds for vacatur.
- Disputed on appeal: whether a reviewable “policy” exists, whether Title III requires a factual basis, whether § 1373 overrides the Privacy Act here, and whether the Paperwork Reduction Act applies.
- Not established by the opinion: how many registrants nationwide were flagged, how many were confirmed noncitizens, and how many citizens were wrongly removed. The opinion documents individual cases, not totals, and RSN did not locate an official figure for any of the three.
- Contested and unresolved: whether the Department’s October 15 suit against California, United States v. California, No. 2:26-cv-12025 (C.D. Cal.), which concerns ballots sent to more than 20,000 registrants it calls likely noncitizens, falls within the vacatur. The Department says it does not, because DHS bought California’s public list and did not use SAVE (Mot. at 13-14). Common Cause has asked the court for a status conference.
The Institutional Lesson
Noncitizen voting in federal elections is a crime. HAVA obliges every state to make a reasonable effort to remove ineligible registrants. A federal government that wants accurate rolls is pursuing a lawful end, and the court said so: the Department “may continue to investigate violations of the NVRA and HAVA within the confines of its statutory authorities—including by acting on specific complaints, as the record demonstrates that it has done in certain instances” (p. 73).
The failure is that the Department chose the fastest route instead of the defensible one. Form letters without a stated factual basis. A 2003 records notice stretched to cover every registered voter in the country. No Paperwork Reduction Act notice. Bulk transfers where the statute contemplates particular records. And a citizenship screen its own agreement said could not reliably verify a known category of citizens. Each of those choices was avoidable, and each became a ground on which the program lost, in this court and, by the court’s count, in at least 25 others. The result is that a legitimate enforcement priority now stands vacated weeks before the November 3 midterms, and the documented record of wrongly flagged citizens is available to anyone who argues that citizenship verification is inherently a pretext. That is a self-inflicted wound to the cause the program was meant to serve.
There is a structural point as well. The court rested its statutory holding on the principle that the states run voter rolls, citing the Supreme Court’s statement in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council that the Elections Clause lets Congress regulate how federal elections are held, “but not who may vote in them” (p. 53). RSN examined the same line, applied against a federal statute many conservatives support, in its analysis of the Cox ruling on Section 611. Federalism that applies only when it helps is not a principle.
Finally, consider who inherits the tool. A centralized federal file of every registered voter’s identifiers and, where states record it, party affiliation, held in a Justice Department investigative database and shareable with contractors, would not remain in the hands of the administration that built it. The Privacy Act was written to prevent exactly that kind of federal data bank. RSN made the same argument about executive power over the press in its analysis of the White House press ban ruling: powers claimed today are powers the next president keeps.
The defensible path is visible in the opinion itself. States can and do run their own checks; the Supreme Court’s September stay leaves the modified SAVE system available to them while that litigation proceeds. The Department can open investigations based on specific evidence of noncompliance. It can publish a records notice that tells Americans what it will collect and why. The Social Security Administration’s citizenship data can be corrected, a problem its own Inspector General identified two decades ago. And if the executive believes it needs authority to compile and compare state voter lists, Congress can grant it, with the privacy safeguards the current statutes require. Accountability here means asking why a Department with these options chose the one most likely to fail.
Sourcing Note
Page references and quotations are to the October 9, 2026 memorandum opinion (ECF No. 51) and to the Department’s October 16, 2026 motion for stay pending appeal (ECF No. 57, cited by its internal page numbers), both read in full. The docket is available on CourtListener. Judge Sooknanan was confirmed in December 2024 after nomination by President Biden. Details of Anthony Nel’s case beyond the opinion come from Courthouse News; the Department’s statement that it was reviewing the decision was reported by CBS News. RSN did not review the notice of appeal or the California complaint directly. This article analyzes court filings and does not assert that any individual voter was or was not eligible.
Featured image: Robert F. Kennedy Department of Justice Building, Washington, D.C. Photo by Coolcaesar via Wikimedia Commons, licensed CC BY-SA 3.0.
